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Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as 
unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, thus sparing 
their incumbent employer the firing costs. Furthermore, employers can induce their 
unprofitable workers to accept outside job offers that they would otherwise reject by offering 
voluntary severance packages, which are less costly than the full statutory firing cost. We 
formalize those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides 
(DMP) matching model that allows for employed job search and negotiation over severance 
packages. We find that, while essentially preserving most standard qualitative predictions of 
the DMP model without employed job search, our model explains why higher firing costs 
intensify job-to-job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment. We further 
find that allowing for on-the-job search markedly changes the quantitative predictions of the 
DMP model regarding the impact of firing costs on unemployment and employment flows: 
ignoring on-the-job search leads one to strongly underestimate the negative impact of firing 
costs on unemployment. 
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 1 Introduction
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape ﬁring costs. While the primary eﬀect of
ﬁring costs is to induce ﬁrms to keep employees in unproﬁtable matches, such unproﬁtable employees
may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside oﬀer, thus sparing their incumbent employer
the ﬁring costs. Furthermore, employers can induce their unproﬁtable workers to accept outside
job oﬀers that they would otherwise reject by oﬀering voluntary severance packages, which are less
costly than the full statutory dismissal cost. We formalize those mechanisms within an extension
of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994)
that allows for employed job search and negotiation over severance packages.
The impact of ﬁring costs on labor market equilibrium has been an object of keen study in
the search and matching literature (see the review in Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, or more
recently Ljungqvist, 2002). Firing costs are typically found to discourage both job destruction and
job creation, thereby substantially reducing both unemployment outﬂows and inﬂows with a result-
ing eﬀect on the equilibrium unemployment rate which is ambiguously signed and quantitatively
negligible.1
Yet that large body of research consistently ignores direct job-to-job ﬂows. Job-to-job ﬂows
are quantitatively substantial, amounting to between a third and a half of total labor reallocation,
and relevant to the issue of ﬁring costs as a worker who quits a job spontaneously is usually not
entitled to any redundancy payment and does not make the ﬁrm liable to a ﬁring tax. We thus
propose to introduce employed job search in a DMP-type model with ﬁring costs and a minimum
wage (the role of which we will discuss momentarily). We show that the presence of employed
job search strongly aﬀects the response of unemployment ﬂow rates and the unemployment rate to
increases in ﬁring costs when the minimum wage is not too low. Speciﬁcally, while higher ﬁring
costs discourage job destruction much in the same way as they do in the DMP model without
employed job search, we ﬁnd that employed job search largely cushions the adverse impact of ﬁring
1Of course this somewhat sweeping summary does not do justice to the vast literature on that subject and
exceptions to those ﬁndings do exist. A relevant example for our purposes is Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999) who point
out that the degree of wage rigidity (speciﬁcally, the level of the minimum wage) is a key determinant of the impact
of ﬁring costs on labor market equilibrium in the DMP model.
2costs on job creation. As a result, ﬁring costs have a quantitatively sizeable negative impact on
the unemployment rate in that model. The diﬀerence in the economy’s behavior brought about by
on-the-job search is due to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, job-to-job turnover enable employers
to avoid paying the statutory ﬁring cost in some cases.
Aside from on-the-job search, our model has two important speciﬁc features. First, as an
alternative to the conventional practice of applying the Nash solution, we assume that mutual
consent is the basic principle governing wage (re)negotiation in continuing ﬁrm-worker matches.
Speciﬁcally, under that assumption, the wage is only altered when one of the worker’s or the ﬁrm’s
outside options becomes binding, in which case the wage is revised up or down by just enough to
satisfy whichever constraint is binding. It is an attractive assumption because it features in many
labor contracts (see Malcomson, 1997, for empirical evidence), it delivers realistic wage dynamics
(Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2010), and it can be justiﬁed theoretically in diﬀerent contexts (see the
discussion in footnote 3 below and in Appendix A). Most importantly, as we show in the paper,
that assumption lends itself well to the analysis of endogenous severance packages, which arise
naturally in the formal bargaining game that we use to deliver the wage determination rules just
described.
The second distinguishing feature of our model is, as already mentioned, the presence of a
minimum wage. We introduce a minimum wage for two reasons. First, studying the combined
impact of ﬁring costs and the minimum wage — two of the most common ingredients of labor market
regulation in OECD economies — is an interesting exercise in its own right (Cahuc and Zylberberg,
1999, Boeri and Burda, 2009, Silva, 2010). Second, although so far we have put the emphasis on
employers oﬀering their workers severance packages to induce them to quit into alternative jobs, in
certain circumstances severance packages may also be used by employers as a means to induce their
workers to quit into unemployment (as opposed to ﬁring them and incurring the ﬁring cost). As
ﬁrst shown by Fella (2007) and conﬁrmed in this paper, if employers are allowed to oﬀer severance
packages to induce quits into unemployment, then some form of wage rigidity is required for ﬁring
costs to have any impact at all on job ﬂows and unemployment. Intuitively, Fella (2007) shows
3that, if the ﬁring cost is paid by the ﬁrm to a third party (tax, red-tape cost...), it is always in
the joint interest of the ﬁrm-worker match to avoid paying that tax by agreeing on a voluntary
separation in which, rather than paying the ﬁring cost (which would then be lost for the match),
the ﬁrm oﬀers the worker a voluntary severance package equal to the worker’s foregone surplus
from employment. In so doing, the ﬁrm eﬀectively turns the ﬁring tax into a transfer to the worker:
the distinction between redundancy tax and transfer is rendered ineﬀectual by severance packages.
As is well known (at least since Lazear, 1990), absent wage rigidity, ﬁring restrictions in the form
of ﬁrm-worker transfers can be completely oﬀset by contracts between risk-neutral employers and
employees. Fella’s (2007) contribution is to show that ﬁring taxes can also be oﬀset as long as
risk-neutral employers and employees are able to negotiate side-payments (severance packages) to
induce workers to quit into unemployment without incurring the ﬁring tax. This results no longer
holds, however, in the presence of a source of wage rigidity such as an institutional wage ﬂoor.
We will see that in our model, as in Fella’s, the economy ﬁnds itself in two very diﬀerent regimes
regarding the eﬀectiveness of ﬁring costs depending on whether the minimum wage is binding at
the point of job destruction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our model is described in the next section, and
its solution with exogenous contact rates is discussed in Section 3. The characterization of the full
model solution, i.e. with endogenous contact rates is presented in Section 4. A calibration and
simulation illustration is carried out in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The environment
Technology. We take up all basic assumptions about the workings of the product and labor
markets from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), from which we only depart by allowing employed
workers to search on the job. The labor market thus features a unit mass of workers facing a
continuum of identical ﬁrms producing a unique multi-purpose good sold in a perfectly competitive
product market. Workers and ﬁrms are inﬁnitely lived, forward-looking, risk-neutral and have a
4common exogenous discount rate of ρ. Time is continuous and the economy is in steady state.
Workers can either be unemployed or matched with a ﬁrm. Firms and workers are matched
through a time-consuming search process, modeled in the following conventional way: unemployed
(employed) workers receive job oﬀers at a Poisson rate λ0 (λ1). We thus assume that all workers
search for a (better) job and that their search intensity, although exogenous, depends on their
employment status. We should note from the outset that not all oﬀers are conducive to an actual
match: workers will only accept an oﬀer whenever it yields greater value than what they enjoy in
their current state (more details on this below). Finally, note that we are treating the oﬀer arrival
rates λ0 and λ1 as exogenous parameters for the time being. We shall endogenize them later in the
analysis by means of a matching function.
Firms operate a constant-return technology and are modeled as a collection of job slots which can
either be vacant or occupied and producing. The quality of worker-ﬁrm matches is heterogeneous
and subject to shocks. We deﬁne the output ﬂow of a match as y = p · z, where p is an aggregate
productivity index and z is match-speciﬁc productivity, comprised in [0,1] and subject to shocks.
The (Poisson) arrival rate of shocks to match productivity is denoted δ, and the post-shock value of
z (z′, say) is drawn from a continuous distribution F (·) over [0,1], independently of the pre-shock
value of z.2 Shocks are also uncorrelated across matches. Finally, following standard practice, we
assume that all new matches start out with the highest level of productivity, z = 1. Then, like
the conventional DMP model, our model features endogenous job destruction: upon drawing a
productivity shock below a certain threshold (to be formally deﬁned below), the ﬁrm will want to
end the employment relationship.
Institutions. One of the objectives of this paper is to analyze the combined impact of ﬁring costs
and the minimum wage on labor market equilibrium. We thus assume that ﬁrms are required to
pay all their employees a wage greater than the institutional wage ﬂoor wmin, and are liable to a
ﬁring cost of T payable upon laying oﬀ a worker. It is important to stress that statutory dismissal
2This latter assumption is common in this literature, though not necessarily desirable as implying identical de-
struction hazards for all jobs. We still maintain it, in the interest of tractability.
5costs are only applicable to employer-initiated separations to which the worker does not consent.
T and wmin are exogenous policy parameters. In line with much of the literature, it may be
easiest in the rest of this paper to think of T as either a ﬁring tax paid or as red tape costs, i.e.
as a third-party payment which is a net loss to the ﬁrm-worker match rather than a statutory
transfer paid by the ﬁrm to the worker upon separation. However, given our wage determination
rule and the possibility for ﬁrms and workers to negotiate severance packages, that distinction has
no bearing on the impact of T on equilibrium job ﬂows and unemployment (it only aﬀects the
distribution of payoﬀs). Formal details are given in Appendix A.
2.2 The employment relationship
Notation and working assumptions. Considering a ﬁrm-worker match with a current idiosyn-
cratic productivity level of z, we denote the wage ﬂow paid in this match by w and deﬁne J (z,w)
[resp. E (z,w)] as the value of this match to the ﬁrm [resp. to the worker]. We also introduce
the total (gross) match value: V (z) = J (z,w) + E (z,w). We will justify below that this value is
independent of the wage paid. Finally, we denote the worker’s lifetime value of unemployment as
U and assume that the ﬁrm’s valuation of a vacant job is zero, as results from free entry on the
search market (see below).
We start working under the following set of hypotheses about the impact of wages and produc-
tivity on the various value functions: ∂J/∂z > 0, ∂J/∂w < 0, ∂E/∂w > 0, V ′ (z) > 0. All of those
hypotheses will be formally conﬁrmed later in the analysis.
We also assume that there are gains to trade on the labor market. More precisely, workers and
employers are both willing to consummate a match with the maximum productivity level z = 1
and a minimum wage of wmin, i.e. formally E (1,wmin) ≥ U and J (1,wmin) ≥ 0.
We now introduce an additional series of deﬁnitions for future use. We ﬁrst deﬁne R0 (w), the
value of productivity at which, given a wage of w, the ﬁrm’s valuation of the match is zero, by
J [R0 (w),w] = 0. Note that, because of layoﬀ costs, this is not the productivity at which the ﬁrm
decides to terminate the employment relationship. We further denote by w0 (z) the inverse of R0 (·),
i.e. the maximum wage that a ﬁrm can pay without incurring a loss (in expected present value
6terms) given a current productivity level of z. We can then mutatis mutandis deﬁne the threshold
productivity RT (w) as the solution to J [RT (w),w] = −T, and the inverse wT (z) of the function
RT (·). RT (·) gives the cutoﬀ productivity value below which the ﬁrm is better oﬀ ﬁring the worker
(thus incurring the layoﬀ cost T) than retaining her/him at the wage w. Our assumptions about
the monotonicity of J (·) with respect to both of its arguments ensure the consistency of all these
deﬁnitions.
Wage determination. Our wage determination mechanism builds on Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002a, b) and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010). Wages are set by ﬁrms. Workers, however, can use
market pressure to extract some rent. Indeed they will use outside job oﬀers to obtain wage increases
by playing oﬀ potential employers against one another, as detailed in the following paragraphs. The
principle governing all wage renegotiations is that of mutual consent. That is, either party can only
force wage renegotiation to their advantage if the value of their outside option exceeds their current
value in the match, giving them a credible threat to leave the match. When renegotiation does
take place, the wage is adjusted up or down so as to give the forcing party the exact value of their
outside option.3 In the presence of ﬁring costs, the value of the ﬁrm’s outside option is the value
of a vacant job, i.e. zero, less the ﬁring cost T. Since quits are not legally liable to statutory
dismissal costs, the worker’s outside option is either the value of unemployment or the value of
his/her outside job oﬀer, if any.
Severance packages. The most immediate eﬀect of employment protection is to induce ﬁrms to
keep employees even when a negative productivity shock leads them to incur losses (up to the level
of the ﬁring cost) in the current match. Under the mutual consent rule, as long as these losses are
less than the amount the ﬁrm would have to pay to ﬁre the worker, the ﬁrm has no credible threat
to dissolve the match and cannot force the worker to renegotiate the wage downwards.
3Diﬀerent theoretical foundations exist for this rule (see MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993). Models of self-enforcing
wage contracts within a match faced with uncertainty about productivity and/or market opportunities deliver a
similar wage rule (Thomas and Worrall, 1988). Hall (2005) also considers this wage setting mechanism which he
interprets as a social norm favoring wage rigidity. In this particular paper, we justify that rule using an explicit
ﬁnite-horizon bargaining game spelled out in Appendix A. While we do not mean to tout our own theoretical
foundation as being superior to any other, our game has the merit of simplicity.
7Thus an obvious, however little explored consequence of the enforcement of statutory redun-
dancy pay is that it leads ﬁrms and workers to negotiate severance packages aimed at encouraging
the worker to leave when the ﬁrm is currently incurring losses. For example, in the event of an out-
side oﬀer arising, the incumbent employer would be willing to compensate the worker for him/her to
accept it, up to the level of the current losses. Assuming that both worker and ﬁrm can observe the
value of the outside oﬀer, the incumbent ﬁrm will oﬀer a severance package to the worker yielding
him/her a value of quitting with this oﬀer and this severance package marginally greater than the
value of staying with his/her incumbent employer. Employed job search thus allows employers to
escape job security regulations, at least to some extent.
Depending on parameter values, severance packages can just as well arise at the ﬁring margin
(Fella, 2007). We shall see below that, for given values of the minimum wage and unemployment
income, as the ﬁring cost T is increased, it may become both feasible and beneﬁcial for employers
to induce workers to quit into unemployment on being hit by a suﬃciently adverse productivity
shock. Depending on whether this is the case or not, the impact of job security provisions on the
equilibrium layoﬀ rate will be very diﬀerent.
2.3 Outside oﬀers
Given a current wage of w and a current productivity level of z, we denote the continuation values
of the match to the ﬁrm [resp. the worker] after an outside oﬀer as Jo (z,w) [resp. Eo (z,w)].
When an employed worker is contacted by an outside ﬁrm, we assume the sequence of events to
be the following. The outside ﬁrm gets one chance to make the worker an oﬀer, in the knowledge
of current match productivity in the incumbent ﬁrm. A bargaining game is then played between
the worker and incumbent employer, in which the latter has an opportunity to raise the worker’s
wage, to oﬀer a severance package or to do nothing, letting the worker either stay in the match
with the existing wage, or quit to the poaching ﬁrm. Details of a speciﬁc strategic game are given
in Appendix A and we only give an intuitive description of the outcome of the bargain in the main
text.
Denote the value to the worker of the outside oﬀer by E′. Because all new matches start out
8with the maximum productivity level z = 1, the maximum worker’s value of the outside oﬀer is
V (1), which is also the maximum value of employment as the worker is never able to claim a
wage yielding a higher value than this, having no outside oﬀer enabling him/her to do so. The
minimum value of the outside oﬀer is in turn constrained by the existence of a minimum wage to
be E (1,wmin). For future use, we denote by zm the value of the match productivity such that
E (1,wmin) = V (zm). So the boundaries of the worker’s value of the outside oﬀer are summarized
as: V (zm) ≤ E′ ≤ V (1).
If the value of the outside oﬀer is less than the worker’s value of the current match, i.e. E′ <
E (z,w), the worker will opt to stay with the current ﬁrm. If, however, the incumbent ﬁrm is
incurring losses in this match, it will be in its best interest to oﬀer a severance package to the
worker to induce him/her to take up the outside oﬀer. The minimum value required by the worker
to do so is E (z,w) − E′. The ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀer this amount if it is lower than the
current (negative) ﬁrm’s value of the match. Note that the ﬁrm always has the option of ﬁring the
worker and pay the layoﬀ premium of T, which therefore is an upper bound on the value of the
severance package that the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer.
We ﬁrst consider the case where the incumbent ﬁrm is currently incurring losses at the prevailing
wage, i.e. J (z,w) < 0 ⇔ E (z,w) > V (z) ⇔ z < R0 (w) ⇔ w > w0 (z). As the worker is never able
to raise his/her wage above w0 (1), the ﬁrm cannot be making losses when the match productivity
equals 1. If 1 > z ≥ zm, the poacher will make a maximum oﬀer yielding the worker a value of
V (z), which is less than the current worker’s value of the incumbent match, E (z,w), since the ﬁrm
is making losses. So, as it stands, the worker would opt to stay with the incumbent ﬁrm. However,
as this latter is incurring losses, it is in its interest to induce the worker to leave and it will do so by
oﬀering a severance package exactly compensating the worker for the diﬀerence between the oﬀer
and his/her current value of employment: E (z,w) − V (z) = −J (z,w). As a result, the worker
quits her/his job with a continuation value of Eo (z,w) = E (z,w), leaving her/his initial employer
with a value of Jo (z,w) = J (z,w) < 0. If z < zm, the poacher’s oﬀer cannot be worth less than
V (zm) to the worker because of the binding minimum wage. If that is greater than the value the
9Incumbent employer...
incurs losses: z ≤ R0 (w) makes a proﬁt: z > R0 (w)
Eo E (z,w) V (z)
1 ≥ z > zm Jo J (z,w) 0
V o V (z) V (z)
Eo max{V (zm);E (z,w)} V (zm)
zm ≥ z Jo −max{E (z,w) − V (zm);0} 0
V o V (zm) V (zm)
Table 1: Continuation values after an outside oﬀer
worker gets from the current match, s/he will leave spontaneously. If it is lower, the incumbent
ﬁrm will oﬀer a severance package of E (z,w) − V (zm) to induce him/her to leave. The worker
thus leaves the initial match with a continuation value of Eo (z,w) = max{E (z,w);V (zm)}, while
the incumbent employer receives a continuation value of Jo (z,w) = −max{E (z,w) − V (zm);0}.
Note that this is greater than J (z,w), so that the worker’s receipt of an outside oﬀer is a positive
shock for the ﬁrm in this instance.
Let us now look at the case where the ﬁrm currently makes a proﬁt, i.e. where z ≥ R0 (w) ⇔ w ≤
w0 (z). Three situations may arise, depending on the value of z. First, if z = 1, then the incumbent
and the poaching ﬁrm are equally productive. The worker’s value is then bid up to V (1), i.e. the
worker extracts the whole surplus from either match. The worker then becomes indiﬀerent between
staying with her/his initial employer or taking up the poacher’s oﬀer, and we assume s/he opts for
the former (an innocuous assumption in our context). The continuation value of the initial match
will hence be split into Eo [1,w0 (1)] = V (1) to the worker and Jo [1,w0 (1)] = 0 to the incumbent
employer. Second, if 1 > z ≥ zm, the worker will leave the incumbent ﬁrm as the poacher now
values the worker’s employment more than the incumbent. When attempting to retain the worker,
the incumbent ﬁrm will bid the wage up to a level yielding the worker a value of V (z), which is the
maximum oﬀer that the incumbent ﬁrm is willing to make. The outside ﬁrm (proﬁtably) oﬀers this
value in order to bid the worker away from the incumbent. Hence in this case Eo (z,w) = V (z)
10and Jo (z,w) = 0. Finally, if z < zm, that maximum oﬀer is less than the minimum oﬀer that the
poacher is allowed to make (because of minimum wage regulations), yielding the worker a value
of E (1,wmin) = V (zm). The worker then quits with a value of Eo (z,w) = E (1,wmin) and the
incumbent ﬁrm is left with a value of Jo (z,w) = 0.




for the worker, the incumbent ﬁrm
and the match after an outside oﬀer in all cases examined above.
2.4 Productivity shocks and wage cuts
Like outside job oﬀers, productivity shocks can prompt wage renegotiation. The rules for wage
renegotiation after a productivity shock are the same as those following an outside job oﬀer, i.e.
they are based on mutual consent, and the same bargaining game is played by the worker and
the ﬁrm. Again details of the game are conﬁned to Appendix A and we only describe the bargain
outcome in the main text.
Because of the mutual consent rule, productivity shocks can only lead to downward wage revi-
sions (or layoﬀs). Indeed a positive productivity shock does not aﬀect the worker’s outside option,
and therefore does not give her/him an opportunity to force her/his employer to accept a wage
increase.4 Now not all productivity shocks will cause a wage cut: again because of the mutual
consent restriction, the productivity shock has to be bad enough that the ﬁrm is better oﬀ ﬁring
the worker (ﬁring cost notwithstanding) than keeping her/him in employment at the current wage
rate. This happens whenever the ﬁrm would incur losses greater than T under the current wage w
and the new productivity draw z′ (say), i.e. formally whenever z′ < RT (w).
When this is the case, the wage is revised down to the point where the ﬁrm’s outside option
(to ﬁre the worker) is met, i.e. to the point where the ﬁrm’s valuation of the match given the new
productivity value z′ equals −T, the value of ﬁring the worker. Formally, the renegotiated wage is
4We are taking a bit of a shortcut here. This statement is only true to the extent that the worker is never
tempted to quit into unemployment. Given the minimum wage wmin, this formally translates into assuming that
E (z,wmin) ≥ U for all “viable” values of z, i.e. values of z such that the match is not dissolved (more on this below).
Were this not the case, ﬁrms would sometimes have to raise their worker’s wage following an adverse productivity
shock in order to keep them from quitting into unemployment. While this latter situation is undeniably a theoretical
possibility, covered in the renegotiation game analyzed in Appendix A, we regard it as factually implausible and rule
it out in the main body of the paper.
11set to wT (z′).
Of course it may happen that the minimum wage makes this legally impossible. For instance
it may happen that the ﬁrm incurs losses greater than T, even when paying the minimum wage
wmin. In this case (which formally translates as z′ < RT (wmin)), the match is dissolved. Yet
the situation regarding match dissolution is further complicated by the possibility of negotiating
severance packages. We now analyze the job destruction rule in detail.
2.5 Job destruction
Two regimes. As argued above, if productivity falls short of RT (wmin), then the ﬁrm is better
oﬀ ﬁring the worker and paying T than maintaining the match. As a result, any job drawing a
productivity level below RT (wmin) will inevitably be destroyed. Whether or not jobs are maintained
at all productivity levels above RT (wmin) depends on the worker’s valuation of those jobs as we
now explain.
First, if E [RT (wmin),wmin] > U + T, then the worker strictly prefers employment at the
minimum wage and any productivity level above RT (wmin) to being laid oﬀ with the maximum
severance payment of T. In this case the ﬁrm can never proﬁtably (i.e. at a cost less than T)
induce the worker to quit into unemployment if z′ ≥ RT (wmin), and will ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁre
the worker as soon as z′ < RT (wmin). In this situation, separations are privately ineﬃcient as the
match surplus is strictly positive at RT (wmin).5
If conversely E [RT (wmin),wmin] ≤ U + T, then there is scope for the ﬁrm and the worker to
negotiate a severance package smaller than T that will induce the worker to quit into unemploy-
ment. Indeed consider a match where the going wage is w(≥ wmin) and a productivity draw of
z′ (≥ RT (wmin)) such that U < E (z′,w) ≤ U + T and J (z′,w) < 0. The ﬁrm thus incurs losses
and would like the worker to leave, but this latter is not going to do so spontaneously because
E (z′,w) > U. The compensation it would take to induce the worker to leave is E (z′,w) − U ≤ T
and the employer’s value of inducing a quit is therefore −E (z′,w) + U = J (z′,w) − [V (z′) − U].
Assuming that the ﬁrm and the worker can sign an agreement whereby the worker accepts to vol-
5It equals V [RT (wmin)]−U = E [RT (wmin),wmin]−U +J [RT (wmin),wmin] = E [RT (wmin),wmin]−U −T > 0.
12untarily leave the ﬁrm with a severance package of E (z′,w) − U, it will be in the parties’ joint
interest to do so as soon as the productivity shock falls in a range such that V (z′) < U, i.e. falls
short of the threshold RS deﬁned by V (RS) = U, such that the match surplus is zero. Separations
are privately eﬃcient in this case.6
Summary of the job destruction rule. We use the generic notation D to designate the job
destruction threshold, i.e. the level of idiosyncratic productivity below which matches break up.
The above developments make it clear that the labor market will be in one of two regimes, with
either D = RT (wmin) or D = RS. In the former regime, separations are privately ineﬃcient and
directly governed by a binding minimum wage and mandatory severance pay. In the latter regime,
separations are privately eﬃcient given T and wmin, and the impact of these two policy instruments
on the job destruction rate is only indirect (see below). For want of a better denomination, we shall
refer to the case D = RT (wmin) as the “ineﬃcient separation regime” and to the case D = RS as
the “eﬃcient separation regime”.
Considerations in the previous paragraph imply that the job destruction threshold D can be
generically deﬁned over both regimes as D = max{RT (wmin),RS}. Section 3 below establishes
formal deﬁnitions of RT (wmin) and RS, analyzes the conditions under which either regime will
prevail and studies the impact of T and wmin under both regimes.
2.6 Continuation values after a productivity shock
Given an initial wage of w, we denote the expected values of the match to the ﬁrm [resp. the worker,
the match] after a shock to z as Js (w) [resp. Es (w), V s]. The generic analytical expressions
of those continuation values are somewhat cumbersome (due to the fact that one has to consider
diﬀerent regimes depending on the relative ranking of various productivity thresholds). Fortunately,
we do not need to spell them out as the ensuing analysis will only make use of a few relatively
simple special cases. At this point we only bring up the obvious (yet important) remark that these
6Relating to footnote 4 above, we implicitly assume throughout the analysis that the minimum wage is high
enough that the worker is never willing to quit into unemployment without severance compensation. At this point
this formally amounts to assuming that E (Rs,wmin) > U.
13continuation values do not depend on any particular value of z (which immediately ﬂows from the
assumption of independent sequential productivity draws).
2.7 Bellman equations
We end our layout of the model by formally writing down the Bellman equations solved by the
various value functions deﬁned and used above.
(ρ + δ + λ1)J (z,w) = pz − w + δJs (w) + λ1Jo (z,w) (1)
(ρ + δ + λ1)E (z,w) = w + δEs (w) + λ1Eo (z,w) (2)
(ρ + δ + λ1)V (z) = pz + δV s + λ1V o (z) (3)
(ρ + λ0)U = b + λ0V (zm) (4)
These deﬁnitions will be used for derivations below. A series of properties of these functions is
established in Appendix B.
3 Model solution: the case of exogenous contact rates
In order to gain some insight about the equilibrium impact of the minimum wage and ﬁring costs
on labor market performance, we begin by treating the ﬁrm-worker contact rates, λ0 and λ1, as
exogenous parameters. Again, those will be endogenized later on. The purpose of this ﬁrst step in
the analysis is to focus on the partial impact of T and wmin on the job separation margin.7
3.1 The job destruction thresholds
The ineﬃcient separation regime: D = RT (wmin). By deﬁnition of the ineﬃcient separation
regime, the job destruction condition is given by D = RT (wmin) ⇔ J (D,wmin) = −T. Substituting
this deﬁnition into the Bellman equation (1) deﬁning the ﬁrm’s valuation of a job, J (·), is shown
in Appendix C to translate into the following job destruction condition:
D +
δ









(ρ + λ1) (JDi)
where, in standard fashion, a bar over a CDF denotes the corresponding survivor function.
7Once again, as stated in footnotes 4 and 6, we assume throughout the analysis that parameters are such that the
worker is never willing to quit into unemployment without severance compensation, i.e. that E (D,wmin) > U.
14The eﬃcient separation regime: D = RS. In the eﬃcient separation regime, the ﬁrm and the
worker agree to separate when the joint value of the match reaches the value of unemployment:
V (RS) = U (JDe)
The formal deﬁnition of RS is somewhat more involved than that of D in the ineﬃcient separation
regime, and we therefore leave it in Appendix C, equations (A.6) to (A.8). Inspection of those
three equations, from which the parameter T is absent, readily conﬁrms the following result by
Fella (2007) in our environment — which diﬀers from his by the presence of on-the-job search and
wage renegotiation by mutual consent:
Proposition 1 In the eﬃcient separation regime, ﬁring costs have no impact on the job destruction
threshold, RS.
This result is formally established in Appendix C. The underlying intuition is spelled out in Fella
(2007). If the ﬁring cost is a tax, paid by the ﬁrm to a third party, actually paying that tax is in the
interest of none of the parties in a joint-surplus-maximizing ﬁrm-worker match. Now institutions
provide ﬁrm-worker matches with a way of dodging that tax: because the ﬁring tax only applies to
layoﬀs and not to quits, if the ﬁrm’s value of the match becomes negative, so that the ﬁrm would like
to terminate the match, it will induce a quit by oﬀering the worker a voluntary severance package
(equal to the worker’s foregone surplus from employment) rather than ﬁre the worker and incur
the ﬁring tax. In so doing, the ﬁrm eﬀectively turns the ﬁring tax into a transfer to the worker. In
the eﬃcient separation regime, the minimum wage is low enough to allow for that transfer to be
fully priced out (in expectation) by adjusting the wage over the lifetime of the match. Things are
diﬀerent in the ineﬃcient separation regime, where the minimum wage prevents the ﬁrm and the
worker from fully pricing out severance packages. In that case the ﬁring cost, even though it is still
turned into a transfer to the worker, has bite.
3.2 Conditions under which either regime prevails
Given ﬁxed contact rates λ0 and λ1, which one of the ineﬃcient or eﬃcient separation regime prevails
depends on the implemented mix of employment protection, minimum wage and unemployment
15compensation following a general pattern that we summarize in the ensuing two propositions8.
Proposition 2 For a given value of the minimum wage wmin and the unemployment income b,
there exists a cutoﬀ value Tc (wmin,b) ≥ 0 of the statutory redundancy pay (possibly equal to zero)
such that the ineﬃcient separation regime prevails for all T ≤ Tc (wmin,b) while the eﬃcient sepa-
ration regime prevails for all T > Tc (wmin,b).
Given the minimum wage and unemployment beneﬁts, the ineﬃcient separation regime tends to
prevail under low values of the ﬁring cost. As the ﬁring cost is increased, it becomes increasingly
worthwhile for ﬁrms to negotiate whatever side payment fully compensates the worker for quitting
into unemployment as match productivity hits low levels in order to avoid paying the full ﬁring
cost.
Similar results hold for the other two policy tools, wmin and b:
Proposition 3 Fix the statutory redundancy pay at a given value T. Then, for a given value
of the unemployment income b (respectively, the minimum wage wmin), there exists a cutoﬀ value
wc
min (T,b) of the minimum wage (respectively, a cutoﬀ value of the unemployment income bc (T,wmin))
such that the eﬃcient separation regime prevails for all wmin ≤ wc
min (T,b) (respectively, all b ≥
bc (T,wmin)), while the ineﬃcient separation regime prevails for all wmin > wc
min (T) (respectively,
all b < bc (T,wmin)).
Again intuitively, given the level of ﬁring costs, the ineﬃcient separation regime tends to prevail
under high values of the minimum wage and low values of the unemployment income. As either
the minimum wage is reduced or the unemployment beneﬁt level is increased, the gap between the
worker’s valuations of employment at the minimum wage vis ` a vis unemployment narrows, and
eventually falls short of the ﬁring cost T, at which point the negotiation of severance packages
lower than T at the job destruction margin becomes feasible.
8Proofs of both propositions can be found in Appendix D.
163.3 Comparative statics
We conﬁne our analysis of comparative statics to the ineﬃcient separation regime as ﬁring costs
do not aﬀect outcomes in the eﬃcient separation regime. The job destruction condition (JDi)
establishes an equilibrium relationship between D and λ1, which is parameterized by the policy tools
(T,wmin). It is straightforward to show by diﬀerentiation that, given λ1, ﬁrms will adopt a lower
D in the face of higher ﬁring costs and a higher D if the minimum wage is raised. Unsurprisingly,
our model thus conﬁrms the standard qualitative predictions about the response of job destruction
behavior to these speciﬁc policy changes.
What is more interesting within the context of our model is to look at the interaction between
ﬁring costs and on-the-job search (as measured by its intensity λ1) in shaping the job destruction
rule. The slope of (JDi) in a (D,λ1) space turns out to be of ambiguous sign for positive ﬁring costs.
Absent such costs, a ceteris paribus increase in λ1 unambiguously reduces the ﬁrm’s valuation of a
job (at any productivity level) as it raises both the worker’s quit rate and the probability of having
to transfer some of the match surplus to the worker in response to an outside job oﬀer, leading the
ﬁrm to discount the positive option value of the job (showing in the integral term in (JDi)) more
heavily. Absent ﬁring costs, a higher λ1 thus clearly leads to an increase in the job destruction
threshold D. When ﬁring costs are in place though, the event of the worker quitting is beneﬁcial
to the ﬁrm in some cases. As we saw in subsection 2.2, any ﬁrm incurring losses is indeed happy to
let its worker go at a cost lower than T: the opportunity arises when the worker receives an outside
oﬀer which s/he will accept, possibly subject to receiving a severance package which is always less
than the statutory ﬁring cost T. In short, employed job search provides a channel through which
employers can escape job security provisions. And of course, the higher the ﬁring cost, the greater
scope there is for this type of situation to arise. As a result, for any positive value of T, the job
destruction schedule becomes downward sloping for high values of λ1.
The ﬂip side of this argument is that employed job search impacts the sensitivity of the job
destruction threshold to changes in job security provisions. When faced with an increase in T, ﬁrms
weigh the cost of hoarding labor to a further extent (by lowering D) against the associated beneﬁt
17of not having to pay the higher ﬁring cost. More speciﬁcally, the direct cost of lowering D is to keep
currently less productive jobs occupied, thus incurring greater current losses. This is mitigated by
a positive eﬀect of lowering D, which is to increase the job’s option value (which accounts for the
possibility of the job becoming proﬁtable again in the future). However, on-the-job search weakens
this positive option value eﬀect as it makes it more likely that the worker will leave the ﬁrm before
the job becomes productive again. Therefore the total cost of cutting the job destruction threshold
is ceteris paribus higher when employees search more intensely. The immediate beneﬁt of further
labor hoarding, on the other hand, is to trade the certainty of having to pay the ﬁring cost now
for the possibility of paying it at some future date. But again this latter possibility is less likely to
materialize in the presence of on-the-job search, as it may cause the worker to leave the job at no
(or little) cost for the ﬁrm. Hence the total beneﬁt of labor hoarding also increases with employed
job search intensity.
Because both the cost and beneﬁt of reducing the job destruction threshold in the face of an
increase in T are higher when employees search more intensely, the net impact of on-the-job search
on the responsiveness of D to ﬁring costs is generally ambiguous. For large enough values of T
though, labor hoarding becomes the more attractive option when workers are searching on the job
and the job destruction threshold will be lower than in the absence of employed job search.
To summarize, in the absence of ﬁring costs, the job destruction threshold will be higher with
on-the-job search than without whereas the opposite is true under large enough ﬁring costs. As a
consequence, when contrasting an equilibrium with zero ﬁring costs with one with large ﬁring costs,
we predict a greater decrease in the job destruction rate when employed job search is allowed.
4 The full model: endogenous contact rates
The analysis so far has kept the ﬁrm-worker contact rates (λ0,λ1) exogenous. While it allowed
us to preserve some analytical tractability (most of which we shall lose in the rest of this paper)
and therefore to analyze the impact of policy on the job destruction margin with some degree of
generality, it is clearly unsatisfactory from an equilibrium viewpoint as it amounts to shutting down
18important aspects of the ﬁrms’ labor demand behavior. We thus now extend the model to allow for
endogenous contact rates. In so doing we shall use a matching function, thus continuing to stick to
the DMP tradition.
4.1 The matching process
Search is random and ﬁrms advertise new jobs in the knowledge that the pool of job seekers com-
prises both unemployed and employed workers. As seen above, all employed workers are assumed
to engage in on-the-job search. Their search intensity, relative to that of unemployed workers, is
denoted s1 = λ1/λ0. We assume the matching technology to exhibit constant returns to scale,
which leads to the following expressions for the two job oﬀer rates: λ0 = χ · θα and λ1 = s1 · λ0,
where θ = v
u+s1(1−u) denotes labor market tightness. u, 1 − u and v denote the stocks of unem-
ployment, employment and vacancies, respectively, χ captures matching eﬃciency and α denotes
the matching elasticity with respect to vacant jobs.
The rate at which a ﬁrm contacts an unemployed [employed] worker is q0 (θ) [q1 (θ)], deﬁned as
follows (we will see shortly that these contacts are not necessarily turned into a match): q0 (θ) =
λ0
θ · u





We assume free entry of vacancies in the search market so that the value of a vacant job is zero.
Under our maintained assumption that E (1,wmin) > U, unemployed workers accept all job oﬀers
made to them as they yield a value that is greater than the value of being unemployed. As seen in
Section 2.3, the optimal oﬀer made to attract an employed worker is to give the worker a value of
V (z), where z is the productivity of the worker’s old match. The expected proﬁt of a vacancy will
thus depend on the distribution of z in ﬁlled jobs. We will denote L(·) the steady-state distribution
of productivity in currently ﬁlled jobs and derive it as follows by writing the ﬂow balance for the
stock of matches with productivity above z:
L(z)δ [F (z) − F (D)] = L(z)
 







[F (z) − F (D)]. (5)
Employed workers accept oﬀers yielding a value (including the severance package if any) greater than
the maximum value of employment that their current employer is prepared to oﬀer them. Workers
currently employed in a match with a productivity less than zm will be successfully attracted
with a wage oﬀer of wmin, leaving the advertising ﬁrm with a value of the new match of J (1,wmin).
Workers currently employed in a match with a productivity z in the range [zm,1] will require a wage
oﬀer that yields them a value of V (z) to quit their existing employer (with or without a severance
package from that employer, as is detailed above in Section 2.3). This leaves the advertising ﬁrm
with a value of the new match of V (1) − V (z). Combining all these facts, we can write the asset
price equation for vacant jobs as:





(V (1) − V (x))dL(x)
 
where k denotes advertising costs. Using (5) and integration by parts, we obtain the following job
creation condition:










(F (x) − F (D))dx
 
(JC)
Condition (JC) equates the marginal ﬂow cost k of posting a vacancy to the marginal expected
ﬂow beneﬁt of doing so. Looking at the expected beneﬁt terms, the ﬁrst of those reﬂects the
expected beneﬁt from contacting an unemployed worker whereas the second one relates to contacts
with already employed workers. The total expected beneﬁt from posting a vacancy decreases with
labor market tightness θ for the following two reasons. First, the matching rates of vacancies are
decreasing functions of θ. Second, the expected value of a new hire is negatively related to θ as a
higher θ causes a higher λ1 which in turn yields an increase in the mass of ﬁlled jobs at the top
productivity z = 1. Besides, the right-hand side of equation (JC) decreases with D as a higher job
destruction threshold raises the mean productivity in ﬁlled jobs in which productivity is greater
9Note the existence of a mass at the productivity of new matches (z = 1) equal to
λ1+δF(D)
δ+λ1 .
20than zm. The job creation condition (JC) thus yields a negatively-sloped relationship between θ
and D.10
The level of ﬁring costs T does not aﬀect the relationship between θ and (zm,D) embodied in
(JC), so increases in T will only aﬀect equilibrium labor market tightness through their impact on
the thresholds zm and D. Finally, let us note that, absent employed job search, all contacts made
by vacant jobs occur with unemployed workers and that these leave, on average, a larger share of
the new match value V (1) to the ﬁrm. As the search intensity of the employed, s1, increases, the
expected beneﬁt of posting a vacancy decreases, so a greater s1 unambiguously discourages job
creation, all other things equal.
4.3 Equilibrium: determination and comparative statics
Details of the derivation of equilibrium are reported in Appendix C. The key equilibrium outcomes,
i.e. D, zm and θ are obtained as the solution to a system of three equations: (A.5), (JC) and (JDi)
[resp. (JDe)] in the ineﬃcient [resp. eﬃcient] separation regime. The job oﬀer rates λ0 and λ1
and the steady-state unemployment rate u =
δF(D)
λ0+δF(D) can then be deduced from equilibrium labor
market tightness θ.11
We now examine the comparative statics properties of these solutions. Our two policy tools
of interest impact job creation in a conventional way: raising either the minimum wage wmin or
the the ﬁring cost T decreases the expected value of the newly created job, decreasing D for given
values of θ, thus shifting the job creation schedule downwards.
As we saw in section 3.3, at given labor market tightness θ, the job destruction threshold
D decreases with an increase in ﬁring costs T and increases with an increase in the minimum
wage wmin in the ineﬃcient separation regime. These facts combined with the downward shift
10This claim is also straightforward to prove formally by diﬀerentiation of (JC).
11As we saw in subsection 3.3, for small values of ﬁring costs T the job destruction rule deﬁnes an increasing
schedule in the (D,θ) space under the ineﬃcient separation regime. This combined with the negative slope of the
job creation schedule established in the previous subsection ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium when T is small.
For larger values of T however, the slope of the ineﬃcient job destruction schedule may become negative, so, if
the ineﬃcient regime is still prevalent, this opens the possibility of multiple equilibria arising. Things get even less
transparent under the eﬃcient separation regime, where equilibrium is deﬁned by a nonrecursive system of three
nonlinear equations ((A.5), (JC) and (JDi)). While the issue of multiple equilibria is a potential concern, we shall
nonetheless leave it aside from the analysis, relying on the fact that multiple equilibria never occurred in any of the
calibration exercises that we tried.
21of the job creation schedule allow us to predict that an increase in T will result in a decrease in
the job destruction threshold D and an ambiguously-signed change in θ, while an increase in the
minimum wage will result in a drop in labor market tightness θ and an ambiguous net change in
job destruction. It is diﬃcult to say more analytically about the comparative static properties of
our model’s equilibrium. The combined eﬀect of policy on job creation and job destruction on
equilibrium unemployment is ambiguously signed.12 We thus now turn to simulations.
5 Calibration and comparative statics
The simulation exercises that we now describe are intended to illustrate the role of on-the-job search
in the response of the labor market to changes in ﬁring costs and the minimum wage. As will be
seen shortly, this response is markedly diﬀerent with and without employed job search.
5.1 Baseline simulation
Table 2 reports the values that we assign to the model’s parameters and the functional form that
we adopt for the sampling distribution of productivity shocks. Flow parameters are expressed in
monthly values. We set the annual discount rate to 5%, which translates into the monthly value
shown in the table. We assume that productivity shocks occur every three years on average. While
this may seem infrequent, we should recall that these shocks capture profound and long-lasting
changes to match productivity that have the potential of causing a match breakup. The aggregate
productivity index p is normalized to 1. The sampling distribution of match-speciﬁc productivity
shocks F (·) is assumed to be uniform over the (0,1) interval. The matching elasticity with respect
to vacancies, α is set at 0.2, which lies in the range of estimated values reported by Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001). The parameters relating to advertising costs and matching eﬃciency k and
χ are simply calibrated so as to ensure a monthly ﬁnding rate consistent with typical UK facts.
In order to highlight the contrast between labor market responses to changes in institutions with
12Another important property that no longer holds in general under endogenous contact rates is the pattern of
regime prevalence described in Propositions 2 and 3. Because λ0 and λ1 both respond to policy changes in equilibrium,
the monotonicity properties of the match surplus that were used in the proofs of these Propositions are lost. While
any pattern can potentially emerge with endogenous contact rates, the labor market will still behave according to
Propositions 2 and 3 in our simulations below.
22ρ δ k α χ p b wmin
0.0043 1/36 22 0.2 0.3 1 -0.3 0.65
F (·) uniform over (0,1).
Table 2: Baseline model calibration
and without employed job search, we carry out the simulations with two benchmark values of the
relative matching eﬃciency: s1 = 0 and s1 = 0.15. The former value yields a labor market without
employed job search while the latter value delivers a labor market where about a third a labor
reallocation relates to direct job-to-job moves.
As for our institutions of interest, we set the minimum wage at wmin = 0.65 and we allow the
ﬁring cost to vary between 0 and 12 months of the maximum productivity. We also set the unem-
ployment income to b = −0.3. Such a low value is needed to ensure positive match surpluses (at
least over some range of productivity values). It can be justiﬁed if one interprets b as unemployment
income net of speciﬁc costs incurred by the unemployed (search costs, stigma...).
Figure 1 shows the response of various basic labor market indicators to a variation in the
statutory dismissal cost T (x-axis, expressed in months of match output at maximum productivity
z = 1), under both values of the relative matching eﬃciency for the employed detailed above. We
predict monthly job destruction rates of around 1.5% and a job ﬁnding rate for the unemployed of
about 18%, which yields a predicted unemployment rate of around 8%, all in line with typical UK
ﬁgures.
5.2 The impact of ﬁring costs
Job creation and job destruction under both regimes. What is immediately striking in
Figure 1 is the obvious regime switch occurring at a value of T equal to 4-5 months of the maximum
productivity. In spite of contact rates being endogenous in the simulations, the market clearly
behaves as described in Propositions 2 and 3: for a given value of wmin the ineﬃcient separation
regime prevails at relatively low values of T, while the market stays in the eﬃcient separation regime


















































Figure 1: Simulation results for wmin = 0.65 and variable ﬁring costs T (x-axis).
24for a redundancy pay beyond a certain size. Note that the threshold between the two regimes is
lower in the presence of employed job search, so that a market where employed workers’ search
intensity is greater will be more likely to be in the eﬃcient separation regime, for a given level of
the institution mix of T and wmin.
Under the ineﬃcient separation regime and in the absence of employed job search, the qualitative
predictions of our model regarding the impact of statutory ﬁring costs on job destruction and job
creation rates are standard. Higher ﬁring costs slow down both of these, unambiguously reducing
unemployment ﬂows but having a small and ambiguously-signed net eﬀect on the unemployment
rate. In fact, this eﬀect turns out to be slightly positive in this simulation. By contrast, with
on-the-job search, we observe a much sharper decline of the job destruction rate as severance pay
increases, as was predicted in section 3. From a quantitative standpoint, the impact of T on job
destruction is magniﬁed by the presence of on-the-job search, thus suggesting that the ﬁring-tax
avoidance eﬀect of employed job search is quantitatively more important than the discount eﬀect on
the option value (see the discussion in subsection 3.3). The picture relating to the unemployed job
ﬁnding rate also shows a sharp diﬀerence with the simulated results obtained without on-the-job
search: increases in severance pay have hardly any impact on the job ﬁnding rate when employed
job search is allowed. This diﬀerence in responsiveness of job creation to variations in T comes from
the steeper response of the job destruction threshold D to changes in ﬁring costs when employed job
search is present. Indeed, a decrease in D renders a contact made with an employed worker more
attractive in expectation terms as it shifts the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity in ﬁlled jobs
to the left. In other words, it increases the probability that an advertising employer will only have
to oﬀer V (zm) to attract an employed worker upon meeting one (and decreases the probability of
being left with a zero share of the match value, i.e. of making contact with an employed worker in
an existing match with maximum idiosyncratic productivity z = 1). As a consequence, the overall
impact of increases in ﬁring costs on the unemployment rate is much more marked than with than
without on-the-job search as the substantial decrease displayed in the bottom-left panel of Figure
1 illustrates. Increasing the statutory severance pay from 0 to ﬁve months’ maximum productivity
25is predicted to cut the unemployment rate by slightly over 1.5 percentage point.
This, however, only relates to an economy in the ineﬃcient separation regime. As is obvious
from Figure 1, things change dramatically as the economy enters the eﬃcient separation regime, at
which point ﬁring costs cease to have any impact at all.
Job-to-job reallocation. The job-to-job switching rate increases as statutory ﬁring costs are
raised. The job switching rate equals the job oﬀer arrival rate λ1 times the probability that the typ-
ical outside oﬀer be accepted by its recipient, L(1−) = δF (D)/(δ + λ1) — see (5). As the arrival
rate of oﬀers is virtually unaﬀected by ﬁring costs and D decreases markedly, the overall impact is
an increase in the job-to-job turnover rate. This combined with the fact that the unemployment
rate decreases with T implies that total job-to-job reallocation increases while unemployment ﬂows
decrease, so that the share of worker reallocation due to direct job-to-job moves increases markedly
with increases in T, as illustrated in the bottom-right panel of Figure 1. This is consistent with the
prediction that job security provisions “redistribute employment opportunities from unemployed
to employed workers” (Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004). It also matches empirical evidence gathered
by Boeri (1999), who reports shares of job-to-job reallocation within total labor reallocation for
a sample of OECD (mostly European) countries in the range of 30-50% and increasing with the
tightness of employment legislation.
6 Conclusion
Adding on-the-job search and negotiation over severance packages alters markedly the quantitative
predictions of the standard DMP model without employed job search regarding the impact of ﬁring
costs on employment ﬂows and the unemployment rate. In our simulations, increasing the ﬁring
costs from 0 to 5 months of the maximum productivity reduces the unemployment rate by one
and a half percentage points, whereas a typical calibration of the DMP model without on-the-job
search would predict an ambiguous and quantitatively negligible eﬀect on the unemployment rate.
Furthermore, past a certain level of ﬁring cots, further increases in said costs become marginally
ineﬀective, as in Fella (2007). This occurs because, as ﬁring costs are increased beyond a threshold,
26it becomes proﬁtable for ﬁrms to induce workers to quit into unemployment by oﬀering suitable
compensation. That threshold is an increasing function of the minimum wage, so that ﬁring costs are
less likely to impact unemployment when the minimum wage is high. This concurs with arguments
made in Garibaldi and Violante (1998) or Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999), whereby the degree of
wage rigidity is a key determinant of the eﬀectiveness of ﬁring restrictions policies.
The main distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we take into account the possibility of
on-the-job search and job-to-job quits. The role that job quitters play in our framework becomes
important in situations where the ﬁrm incurs losses (in the presence of ﬁring restrictions), poaching
ﬁrms are constrained in the oﬀers they can make (in the presence of a wage ﬂoor) and the incumbent
ﬁrm and worker pair are able to negotiate over the amount of a severance package (under the mutual
consent rule). We argue that the extent of job-to-job reallocation is a key feature of the economy’s
response to a change in the policy choice in terms of combined ﬁring cost and minimum wage. Of
course, it may be that ﬁring costs also impact on employed search intensity if, for example, only
tenured employees are entitled to job protection. This feedback channel is not explored in this
paper and is a possible avenue of extension of this research.
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28APPENDIX
A Strategic bargaining games
In this appendix we give formal details of the strategic bargaining game that is played by parties in a match
after the occurrence of either a productivity shock or an outside job oﬀer. While the same game is played in
both situations, payoﬀs and equilibrium play depend on whether the game was triggered by a productivity
shock or an outside oﬀer. We begin by describing the former case.
1: Worker
2.1: Firm 2.2: Firm
3.1: Worker 3.2 3.3 3.4: Worker 3.5: Worker
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6: F 4.7: F
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
(U, 0) (E, J)
(U + ε, V − U − ε) (U, 0) (U + s, −s) (E, J) (U, −T)
(U + T − ε, −T + ε)
(U, −T)
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Figure A.1: Renegotiation game played after productivity shock.
A.1 Renegotiation following a productivity shock
Consider an ongoing match drawing a new productivity shock x, which, given the wage w inherited from
previous periods, yields values of E and J to the worker and the ﬁrm, respectively. These values are known
to both parties. The game represented in extensive form in Figure A.1 ensues. Following the occurrence
of a productivity shock, the worker has no outside oﬀer in hand, so his outside option is to quit into
unemployment, which has value U. For the ﬁrm, the outside option is worth −T if the ﬁrm has to lay oﬀ the
worker to exit the relationship, as the value of holding a vacant job is zero. If the worker quits, the ﬁrm’s
value is zero as it is not paying the ﬁring cost. In our initial description of the renegotiation game in Figure
A.1 we ignore the minimum wage, which we will reintroduce at a later stage.
Each party has the opportunity to prompt a negotiation. A key aspect of the game is that, in the event
29of a party prompting negotiation, the other party gets one single chance to respond. The worker has ﬁrst
move, and triggering negotiation for the worker means quitting the match (node 1 in Figure A.1. For the
ﬁrm it can mean laying oﬀ the worker or oﬀering them an agreed separation with a side-payment s to be
determined in equilibrium (node 2.2).
If the worker announces a quit, the ﬁrm’s response (node 2.1) is either to let him do so (leading to node
3.2) or to try and retain him (leading to node 3.1), which will be achieved by oﬀering a wage increase yielding
the worker a value of employment in the current match of U + ε, where ε is an arbitrarily small, strictly
positive number. At node 3.1, the worker simply accepts or rejects the ﬁrm’s new oﬀer.
If the worker does not threaten to quit the job, the ﬁrm can do one of three things (node 2.2): do nothing
(leading to status quo payoﬀs: node 3.3), oﬀer a severance package s (leading to node 3.4), or layoﬀ the
worker (leading to node 3.5). If the ﬁrm oﬀers a severance package (node 3.4), the worker may either accept
or reject the oﬀer. In the latter case, status quo prevails and the ﬁrm does not get another chance to layoﬀ in
this round of negotiation (the game ends at node 4.4). Finally, when faced with the threat of a layoﬀ (node
3.5), the worker may of course do nothing and accept to be laid oﬀ (leading to node 4.5), but he also gets
a chance to respond by either oﬀering a severance deal (leading to node 4.6) which the ﬁrm subsequently
accepts or rejects, or by oﬀering to take a wage cut and continue the relationship (leading to node 4.7) which
the ﬁrm subsequently accepts or rejects.
The game is solved in standard fashion by backward induction and we skip the details of the solution
(available on request). Equilibrium strategies as well as the equilibrium value of the severance package s
oﬀered by the ﬁrm at node 2.2 depend on initial match values E and J and their position relative to the
parties’ outside option payoﬀs. When the ﬁrm oﬀers an agreed separation (implying the worker quitting
with a severance package s and the ﬁrm not having to pay the layoﬀ tax T), the worker may reject it if his
value of staying in the match with the status quo, E, is greater than the value of leaving with the severance
package, U + s. Thus the minimum package s that the ﬁrm has to oﬀer for the worker to accept it depends
on the worker’s current value of employment E. If E ≤ U, then a severance package of ε is enough to
induce the worker to leave the match. If E > U, a severance pay of E −U + ε is just enough for the worker
to strictly prefer the agreed separation to the status quo. Note, however, that the ﬁrm will never oﬀer a
severance package in excess of T as this is the amount it would need to pay for a layoﬀ. So s is capped at





T if E > U + T
E − U + ε if U < E ≤ U + T
0 + ε if E ≤ U
Given those values of s, Table A.1 summarizes equilibrium play and payoﬀs for a continuing ﬁrm-worker
match hit by a productivity shock, in all possible cases regarding initial match values.
Binding minimum wage. As mentioned above, the results in Table A.1 were obtained under the
assumption of no binding minimum wage, so that a worker’s wage may be low enough to make unemployment
30J < −T −T < J < 0 J > 0
2.2, 3.5, 4.7, 5.3 2.2, 3.3 2.2, 3.3
E > U wage decrease status quo status quo
V ≥ U {V + T − ε,−T + ε} {E,J} {E,J}
2.1, 3.1, 4.1
E < U — — wage increase
{U + ε,V − U − ε}
2.2, 3.4, 4.3 if U < E ≤ U + T
2.2, 3.5, 4.6, 5.1 if E > U + T
2.2, 3.4, 4.3
E > U agreed separation agreed separation —
V < U {U + s,−s}, s = min(T,E − U + ε) {E + ε,−(E − U + ε)}
2.2, 3.4, 4.3 2.2, 3.4, 4.3 2.1, 3.2
E < U agreed separation agreed separation quit
{U + ε,−ε} {U + ε,−ε} {U,0}
Table A.1: Equilibrium play and payoﬀs after a productivity shock
preferable to employment at that wage, for a given productivity value x. In that case, the worker either quits
or agrees to a separation with an inﬁnitesimal severance pay if the match becomes unproﬁtable (bottom row
of Table A.1), and the worker is able to claim a pay raise by credibly threatening to quit into unemployment
if the match is still proﬁtable (second row of the top panel of Table A.1). Those cases may be ruled out in
the presence of a minimum wage that prevents the worker’s wage from dropping low enough to equate E to
U.
Also in the presence of a minimum wage, the wage may not be allowed to drop enough to reduce the
ﬁrm’s losses to −T + ε (top row of Table A.1, when ﬁrm’s losses exceed T and the worker prefers to stay in
employment, V > U). In the notation introduced in the main text, this happens when the new productivity
draw, x, falls short of RT (wmin). In that case, the match is dissolved (even though it has positive surplus,
V > U), and an agreed separation occurs with a side payment of s = min{E − U + ε,T}.
If T is a transfer. When T is a tax, the sum of payoﬀs upon an agreed separation is U whereas it is
only U − T if a layoﬀ goes ahead. Hence it is always jointly proﬁtable to agree on a severance deal rather
than resort to a layoﬀ, and layoﬀs never occur in equilibrium (Fella, 2007). On the other hand, if T is a
transfer, the sum of payoﬀs upon separation is always U, be it a layoﬀ or a separation. Layoﬀs are no longer
jointly ineﬃcient and occur in some cases. This is the only substantive change to equilibrium brought about
by assuming that T is a transfer from the ﬁrm to the worker rather than a tax.
Suppose that T is now paid directly from the ﬁrm to the worker upon layoﬀ. The only things that
31change in Figure A.1 are the payoﬀs in case of a layoﬀ, i.e. at nodes 4.5, 5.2 and 5.4. If T is a transfer,
the worker receives U + T rather than U at all three of those nodes. Solution of the game by backward
induction, however, reveals that the payoﬀs reported in Table A.1 still apply in the case where the ﬁring cost
is a transfer. The only diﬀerence to the case where T is a tax is that, at node 4.6, the worker now rejects
the severance deal oﬀered by the ﬁrm and gets laid oﬀ, receiving a payoﬀ of U +T instead of U +T −ε. So
when T is a transfer, a fraction of the separations are now labeled as layoﬀs, as opposed to all separations
being agreed on in the case where T is a tax. Apart from that, equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs are the
same in both cases.
A.2 Renegotiation following an outside job oﬀer
Consider an ongoing match with productivity z and wage w (yielding values of E and J to the worker and
the ﬁrm, respectively) in which the worker receives an outside oﬀer with value E′.13 All of those values
are known to both parties. The game represented in extensive form in Figure A.2 ensues. Apart from the
fact that the worker’s outside option is now to accept the outside oﬀer, which has value E′ > U, the game
is identical to the one that is played when renegotiating after a productivity shock (Figure A.1). Also in
Figure A.2, the branch of the game starting at note 2.2 with the ﬁrm laying oﬀ the worker was deliberately
omitted, as it is never played in equilibrium. Indeed, unless an adverse productivity shock occurs, it cannot
be optimal for the ﬁrm to ﬁre the worker (otherwise the ﬁrm would have done so already).
Once again, the game in Figure A.2 is solved by backward induction. Equilibrium payoﬀs and the implied
optimal value E′ of the poacher’s oﬀer are discussed in the main text (see Table 1). Formal details of the
game’s solution are available on request.
1: Worker
2.1: Firm 2.2: Firm
3.1: Worker 3.2 3.3 3.4: Worker
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E′, 0
￿ ￿
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Figure A.2: Renegotiation game played after outside job oﬀer.
13Note that, when the worker receives an outside oﬀer, he is in a continuing match, so E > U and J > −T.
32B Properties of the value functions
In this appendix we establish a set of properties of the value functions deﬁned in equations (1) - (4) that
will be useful for the rest of the analysis.
Derivatives and monotonicity. From Table 1, we know that V o (z) = max{V (z);V (zm)} where,
from (3):
V ′ (z) =

   
   
p
ρ + δ
if z > zm
p
ρ + δ + λ1
if zm ≥ z
(A.1)






as reported in Table A.2.
z ≤ R0 (w) z > R0 (w)
1 ≥ z > zm {V ′ (z);0} {∂E/∂z;∂J/∂z}
zm ≥ z {0;0}
{0;0} if V (zm) ≥ E (z,w)











then follow from the Bellman equations (1) - (4). The
various cases are covered in Table A.3.
z ≤ R0 (w) z > R0 (w)















An important property derived from Table A.3 is that the workers’ valuation of a job, E (·), is independent
of match productivity z whenever the latter is less than zm.
Ranking of various productivity thresholds. The following ranking of some important produc-
tivity thresholds will be used in subsequent developments.
Lemma 1 RT (wmin) < R0 (wmin) < zm ≤ 1 and RS < R0 (wmin).
33Proof. In the ﬁrst series of inequalities, the last inequality is almost by deﬁnition as V (1) >
E (1,wmin) = V (zm) (the inequality there holds true because otherwise there would be no trade
on the labor market). Then, because E (·) is increasing in z over [zm,1] (see Table A.3), we have
that E (zm,wmin) < E (1,wmin) = V (zm). Hence J (zm,wmin) = V (zm) − E (zm,wmin) > 0,
which proves that a ﬁrm paying the minimum wage in a match with productivity zm makes
a proﬁt, hence R0 (wmin) < zm (the second inequality). The ﬁrst inequality RT (wmin) <
R0 (wmin) is a direct consequence of ∂J/∂z being positive throughout.
Now turning to the second claim RS < R0 (wmin), we have that J (RS,wmin) = V (RS) −
E (RS,wmin) = U − E (RS,wmin) (by the deﬁnition of RS). This last term is negative by
assumption (as workers are never willing to quit into unemployment). ￿
C Derivation of the job destruction thresholds
The ineﬃcient separation regime: D = RT (wmin). By deﬁnition of the ineﬃcient separation
regime, the job destruction condition is given by D = RT (wmin) ⇔ J (D,wmin) = −T. Combining this
condition with the Bellman equation (1) deﬁning the ﬁrm’s valuation of a job J (·) in (1), we get:
−(ρ + δ + λ1)T = pD − wmin + δJs (wmin) + λ1Jo (D,wmin). (A.2)
From Table ??, the ﬁrm’s value of the continuing match after an outside oﬀer, Jo (D,wmin) is zero as
E (D,wmin) < V (zm). The ﬁrm’s expected value of the continuing match after a shock to match quality
becomes:
Js (wmin) = −T · F (D) +
  1
D
J (x,wmin)dF (x) = −T +
p




where the second equality is obtained with integration by parts and the partial derivative values in Table
A.3 (note that this integration by parts also uses the property zm ≥ R0 (wmin), from Lemma 1.). The job
destruction rule (JDi) then obtains by substitution of Jo and Js into (A.2).
D +
δ









(ρ + λ1) (A.4)
where, in standard fashion, a bar over a CDF denotes the corresponding survivor function.
The deﬁnition of zm, V (zm) = E (1,wmin), implies that V (1) − V (zm) = J (1,wmin). The derivative
V ′ (z) derived in (A.1) imply in turn that V (1)−V (zm) =
p(1−zm)
ρ+δ , while the partial derivatives ∂J/∂z given
in Table A.3 further imply that J (1,wmin) = J [RT (wmin),wmin] +
p(1−RT(wmin))
ρ+δ+λ1 = −T +
p(1−RT(wmin))
ρ+δ+λ1 .
Combining both expressions, we obtain a solution for zm:
zm =
λ1 + (ρ + δ)RT (wmin)
ρ + δ + λ1




34The eﬃcient separation regime: D = RS. The formal deﬁnition of D applying in this case is
slightly more involved and will require solving the three equations derived below for the unknowns RS, zm,
V (zm).




[b + λ0V (zm)]
Derivatives given in Table A.3 further imply that V (zm) = V (RS) +
p(zm−RS)
ρ+δ+λ1 . Combining this with the
job destruction condition in the eﬃcient regime V (RS) = U, we obtain a ﬁrst expression for V (zm):
ρV (zm) = b +
ρ + λ0
ρ + δ + λ1
· p(zm − RS) (A.6)
Second, the value of employment when ﬁrst hired from unemployment (recall that new matches start with
a productivity of 1) is obtained from Bellman equation (2) applied to this speciﬁc case:
(ρ + δ + λ1)E (1,wmin) = wmin + δF (RS)E (RS,wmin) + δ
  1
RS
E (x,wmin)dF (x) + λ1V (1),
which, after some algebra,14 gives us our second expression for V (zm):
ρV (zm) = wmin +
λ1p
(ρ + δ + λ1)(ρ + δ)
·
 






Finally, using Bellman equation (3) to write the value of the surplus at zm:




we obtain our third equation:15
ρ(ρ + δ + λ0)
ρ + λ0














The three equations (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8) pin down the three unknowns V (zm), RS and zm. It is clear
from these equations that RS does not depend on T as ﬁring costs are absent altogether from the system
of equations. This contrasts with the ineﬃcient separation regime seen above where T clearly impacts on
RT (wmin) as equation (A.4) above shows.
D Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
As discussed in Section 3, the ineﬃcient separation regime prevails whenever V (D) > U where D, the job
destruction threshold, equals RT (wmin) and is deﬁned in (A.4). We ﬁrst diﬀerentiate (A.4) to obtain the
14First substitute E (1,wmin) = V (zm), then use integration by parts in the integral taking the value of
∂E (x,wmin)/∂x from Table A.3.
15Again, this involves integration by parts in the integral taking the value of V
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Now evaluating V (z) at z = D = RT (wmin) using the deﬁnitions (3) and (4) and rearranging using (JDi)
and (A.1) leads to:
(ρ + δF (D) + λ1)V (D) = wmin − b − (ρ + λ1)T −
λ0 − λ1
ρ + δ + λ1
 
λ1p(1 − D)
ρ + δ + λ1








The right hand side in (A.15) is a function of the policy tools T, wmin and b, both directly and through the
threshold values D and zm, which we denote by N (T,wmin,b). Using the partial derivatives derived above in
(A.9)-(A.14), tedious but straightforward algebra allows to establish that ∂N/∂T < 0, ∂N/∂wmin > 0, and
∂N/∂b < 0 (we do not report the derivations here but keep them available on request). It is likewise fairly
straightforward to show that limT→+∞ N (·) = limb→+∞ N (·) = −∞ and that limwmin→+∞ N (·) = +∞.
This proves Propositions 2 and 3.
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